Swift Boat Veterans For Truth: A Political Communication Campaign
Analyzing Components To Determine Success
Spring 2006
History Of Negative Ads
Negative ads are a specific type of television ad that “are direct and personal attacks meant to reduce the credibility of the opposing candidate – create doubt, stir fear, exploit anxiety, or motivate ridicule” (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004, p. 154). Kathleen Hall Jamieson suggests that there are, indeed, several specific types of attack ads, which she classifies as a) concept ads (those that juxtapose unrelated visual images to suggest false inferences), b) personal witness ads (those which feature regular citizens giving unscripted negative opinions about the opponent), and c) neutral reporter ads (those in which a series of informational statements is made and then the voter is invited to make a judgment or draw a conclusion about the opponent) (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004, p. 155).
Bruce Gronbeck has identified negative ads as a) implicative (those that operate by innuendo without attacking indirectly), b) comparative (ads that juxtapose the opponent’s record or positions on issues with those of the candidate), and c) assault (those directly assaulting the character, motivations, associates, or actions of an opponent) (Trent & Friedenberg, 2004, p. 155).
Perhaps the most infamous negative ad in history, and one of the first, is Lyndon Johnson’s assault on Barry Goldwater, entitled “Daisy Girl.” “Daisy Girl,” due to its controversial nature, was only aired once. The ad features a girl in a meadow, picking pedals off of a flower and counting. A countdown is heard, the picture fades to black, and a mushroom cloud is seen exploding. The ad was effective, as it significantly raised doubts about Goldwater’s dedication to peace, creating fear that Goldwater was a war-monger (West, 2005, p. 3).
Due to their effectiveness, negative ads became more and more prevalent. In the 1988 presidential campaign, with Massachusetts Gov. Mike Dukakis polling significantly ahead of Vice President George Bush by 17 percentage points (West, 2005, p. 4), Bush’s campaign decided that it would be wise to use negative ads to assault the character of Dukakis. The ads that are historically noted to have turned the game around were the “Weekend Passes” and “Revolving Door” ads, which focused on Willie Horton, “a convicted black man who – while on furlough from a Massachusetts prison – brutally raped a white woman” (West, 2005, p. 4).
Although Dukakis did not start the furlough program, he did support it as a method of rehabilitation, and, in 1976, vetoed a bill that would have made inmates convicted of first-degree murder ineligible for furloughs (Wikipedia.org). Bush seized on the Horton issue, “bringing it up repeatedly in campaign speeches.” Bush's campaign manager, Lee Atwater, declared that "by the time this election is over, Willie Horton will be a household name." Media consultant Roger Ailes was reported to remark "the only question is whether we depict Willie Horton with a knife in his hand or without it” (Wikipedia.org).
In late September of that campaign year, the National Security Political Action Committee began running the “Weekend Passes” attack ad, using the Horton issue, as well as a “menacing mug short of Horton,” to appeal to, what political consultant Larry McCarthy called “every suburban mother’s greatest fear.” The day after “Weekend Passes” went off the air, the Bush campaign created their own version, entitled “Revolving Door,” which also used the furlough program as an issue. While the ad “did not mention Horton or feature his photograph, it did depict a variety of intimidating-looking men walking in and out of prison through a revolving door” (Wikipedia.org).
While the media had been quick to judge the Johnson “Daisy Girl” ad in 1964, the media was not so quick to judge the two Horton ads in 1988. Instead, the media served as providing legitimacy to the ads by featuring news stories of the ads. Additionally, two victims of an assault by a furlough convict, had been featured in stories about pro-Bush rallies. Yet another news story gave background of Horton and supplied a background for the Bush ad. It was not until October 24th – nearly three entire weeks since the Horton ads were first broadcast – that Democrats and members of the Dukakis campaigns went on the news to refute the furlough ads. The ads were characterized as successfully raising doubts on Dukakis and his ability to lead, and he would eventually lose the race to Bush.
Four years later, Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton would know exactly what could hit him. Clinton strategists, led by campaign manager James Carville, sought to “avoid the calamity” of the 1988 Dukakis campaign and incepted a “Rapid Response Team” that would serve to immediately respond to any allegations that Bush and his team would make. Clinton’s team “worked so swiftly that a rebuttal to Bush’s acceptance speech at the Republican convention in Houston had already been completed and sent over the wires before the incumbent president had finished his address” (Hare). Clearly, in this case, the Democrats had learned a valuable lesson, and Clinton would go on to defeat Bush.
Background: Political Environment
In January of 2004, Democratic Presidential candidate Howard Dean seemed unstoppable. He had the momentum, he had the money, and he had the ground crew. But as crunch time came, House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, knowing that his campaign was fledging, decided to take Dean down with his ship. A barrage of negative campaign ads made this a certainty. As caucus-goers needed to find another candidate to back, they turned their attention to Senator John Kerry, who was portrayed as a time-tested, highly decorated Vietnam veteran. Kerry had been a “war hero,” and his campaign slogan, “The Real Deal,” seemed to perpetuate this image. To these caucus-goers, Kerry had the courage to lead, and was a fighter. During one campaign speech, John Kerry told his eventual opponent, President George W. Bush, to “bring it on,” a reference to an earlier Bush speech. John Kerry seemed like the easy choice.
Public opinion on Kerry would not serve Bush well, and for the next ten months, it was the goal for Republicans to change the general population’s views of Kerry. Strategists for the campaign “spent the year ‘looking for a good way to scare the American people’” (Brader, 2006, p. 178). With a barrage of negative campaign ads, portraying Kerry as indecisive, “flip-flopping,” and as someone who undermined his “brothers in arms” in Vietnam, Bush was able to eventually defeat Kerry by a margin of 51% to 48%. A major player in this victory, and the player widely credited with turning the tide and raising doubts about John Kerry was the “527” group, Swift Boat Veterans For Truth.
Swift Boat Veterans For Truth
In 2004, a group of military veterans “formed an ad hoc organization called Swift Boat Veterans For Truth” (West, 2004, p. 80). Swift Boat Veterans for Truth’s main claim was that “it is a matter of public record that John Kerry lied before Congress when he falsely portrayed his fellow service personnel in Vietnam as rapists and baby killers…Kerry’s irresponsible accusations damaged the U.S. war effort,” and “we do believe that testimony endangered our prisoners of war, dishonored those injured and killed in action and did irreparable harm to the reputation of servicemen who served honorably in Vietnam only to return home to unwarranted ridicule and abuse” (Swift Boat Veterans For Truth).
Major Players
John O’Neill: O’Neill was identified by the Wall Street Journal as having "served in Coastal Division 11 in 1969-1970, winning two Bronze Stars and additional decorations for his service in Vietnam (Media Matters).” O’Neill is historically seen as a “counterfoil” to Kerry, and was urged by then-President Nixon to counter Kerry during an appearance on The Dick Cavett Show. In 1972, O'Neill, who had the enthusiastic support of President Nixon and his staff, spoke on Nixon's behalf at the Republican National Convention (Johnson & Kranish). O’Neill would also use horizontal integration by releasing a bestselling critique of Kerry’s war service, entitled Unfit For Command.
Rear Admiral Roy Hoffman: Hoffman served as Chairman of the Swift Boat Vets For Truth. During the war, then-Capt. Hoffmann “was the commanding officer of a task force that included Kerry, who was a Navy lieutenant junior grade.” After one mission for which Kerry received a Silver Star, Hoffmann “sent Kerry and other officers a congratulatory note praising their initiative and aggressive tactics.” After Hoffmann retired from the Navy, he spent "eight years in Milwaukee as the port director before being unceremoniously dumped in 1986 (Spivak & Bice).”
Chris LaCivita: LaCivita served in the United States Marines, eventually achieving the rank of Sergeant. He saw “extensive action in the Persian Gulf War and was wounded in combat and decorated twice.” He has since served as political director for Sen. George Allen (R-VA), then a governor, served as executive director of the Republican Party of Virginia, campaign manager for Allen’s Senate bid, and as political director for the National Republican Senatorial Committee (Center For Politics). LaCivita was mainly responsible for the 2002 issue advocacy ads against then-Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA), which have been seen as controversial. LaCivita joined Swift Boat Veterans as a political consultant, no doubt due to both his extensive political experience as well as his military history. LaCivita was seen as “the glue that was able to bring these veterans in, and to use his skills to make the campaign successful” (Ambinder).
Conceptualization
After the primaries, a group of veterans grew concerned about, what they viewed as, a different John Kerry. In an ad entitled “Lifetime,” Kerry had publicized a photo of himself and 19 other Coastal Division 11 Swift boat officers.
Photo used in “Lifetime” (Swift Boat Veterans For Truth)
In this ad, LaCivita states, “all but three of his entire chain of command (that was shown) were opposed to him (LaCivita). Those shown that were opposed grew against Kerry after both his testimony in a senate hearing on Vietnam (footage of this testimony would later be the subject of one of the Swift Vets ads) and his actions in Vietnam Veterans Against The War. “(The photo) gave the perception they all agreed with his claims,” said LaCivita. The mission of Swift Vets, they felt, should be to create an “issue campaign” around “the specific knowledge of Kerry’s war time service – or lack thereof by first hand accounts of nearly 75 men who served in varying capacities alongside him” (LaCivita).
The communication campaign was conceived by LaCivita after a meeting with John O’Neill and Swift Vet committee member Bill Frankie, and was built around the following structure: 1) Saying what the veterans felt Kerry did (or didn’t) do in Vietnam; 2) Making the case that what he did as head of Vietnam Veterans Against The War was the main reason veterans returned home in disgrace; 3) Arguing that Kerry wasn’t fit from a character issue – to lead the armed forces – especially in a time of war. The ads would seek to raise dissonance over what LaCivita felt was Kerry’s message of “I’m a war hero, and therefore I’m the best to lead during war time” (LaCivita).
Everything was to be shaped in the context of Kerry. The Swift Vets campaign’s strategy was to “educate voters” on the issue of Kerry’s military service, using a “character attack” strategy to leave the impression that Kerry had “grossly exaggerated his own claims at best, and defamed the memory of those left behind” (LaCivita). The desired effect was to spur a downward slope in Kerry’s character ratings.
Design
By appealing to different emotions, ads “can influence the participation and choices of viewers in distinct ways“(Brader, 2006, p. 13). Television is “an ideal medium for surfacing feelings voters already have, and giving these feelings a direction by providing stimuli that may evoke the desired behavior” (Schwartz, 1973, p. 92). Campaign ads use symbolic images and evocative music to trigger an emotional response in viewers (Brader, 2006, p. 13), and it is no doubt that the design of the Swift Boat Veterans For Truth ads led to the campaign’s influence. By using cues like “unpatriotic,” as well as conjuring up feelings about the Vietnam era, the campaign sought to motivate people against Kerry by conditioning viewers to pair the uneasiness after viewing ads to Kerry.
There are several different hypotheses as to why ads trigger emotions. The “confidence hypothesis,” for example, states that “enthusiasm appeals should increase an individual’s confidence in his or her ‘standing decision,’ while fear appeals should increase uncertainty about that decision.” Additionally, the “judgment hypothesis” argues that “fear appeals should decrease reliance in prior preferences and relevant predispositions in political choice, while increasing reliance on new information and contemporary evaluations” (Brader, 2006, p. 71). Thus, fear appeals seek to create doubt in previous decisions, as well as provide new information that would decrease certainty of previous information.
According to Marcus and colleagues (2000), “affect transfer” associates the sponsor with positive emotions and the opponent with negative emotions. From this perspective, affect triggered by the images and music is “transferred” to the candidates being discussed in the ads. As Vietnam is inherently a divisive issue, this concept was vital to the Swift Vets campaign as the design of the ad would need to cause doubt to Kerry’s claims, and certainty to the Swift Vets’ claims. The campaign, then, featured multiple design elements in order to do so.
Visuals
Visual qualities such as images, symbols, and text all play a vital role in political ads. According to Brader, psychologists have “accumulated substantial evidence that pleasant and unpleasant images with themes arouse the expected emotions” (2006, p. 68). Colors differ in their “affective associations,” with dark colors like gray and black “elicit(ing) negative emotions, whereas “bright colors, especially blue, green and red, elicit positive emotions” (Brader, 2006, p. 68). Color has been found to send “a clear and immediate, if unobtrusive, signal about emotion” (Hemphill 1996; Valdez and Mehrabin 1994). Negative ads, expectedly, make heavy use of “grainy black-and-white footage,” and overall, these colors “are ten times more likely to signal a fear or anger appeal than an enthusiasm or pride appeal” (Brader, 2006, p. 157).
Symbols are equally as important, as they possess strong connotations that can be conveyed very simply and quickly. Campaigns ads “use images of people as well as a variety of scenes and symbols to cue distinct emotions” (Brader, 2006, p. 159). Fear and anger ads are “more likely to feature images associated with death, conflict, and misery, such as guns, violent crimes, barren landscapes, pollution and warfare” (Brader, 2006, p. 162).
Visual text, print messages that appear on-screen “grab viewers’ attention and tell them to pay attention to an ad.” Advertisers “have found that memory of a message is greatly enhanced by combining visual text with spoken words and descriptive images” (West, 2005, p. 11).
Music
Music, expectedly, also plays a significant role in political ads, as well, and many consultants claim that music is equally as important as visuals are, playing a vital role in eliciting emotion. People have “long recognized music’s ability to communicate and arouse emotions” (Juslin and Slobada, 2001). In negative ads, discordant music “in minor keys” are used specifically to “increase anxiety” (Juslin, 2000, 2001; J. Smith, 1999). The power of a soundtrack “stems in part from its ability to influence mood and emotional expectations while our attention is focused elsewhere – for example, on speech and pictures” (Schwartz 1983; J. Smith 1999).
Design Elements in the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth Campaign
Black and White Imagery: The ads feature Kerry in black and white photos, although the original footage is available in color, and were clearly designed to go with the somber tone of the ads. In fact, all background images found in the ads are in black and white. The imagery is also rich in symbolism. Symbolic images of boats, anti-war protesters – all Vietnam-related imagery very much engrained in our minds, and entrenched in controversy – are prevalent in this ad. These symbols appeal directly to the viewer’s emotions, tap into previously-held notions, and use oversimplied (and thus, easy to grasp) notions of patriotism, betrayal, and weakness.
Yet, while these images are in black and white, the testimony of the Swift Vets is in bright color, making use of the “affect transfer” phenomenon. These elements are specifically designed to raise doubt towards Kerry, and at the same time, raise the credibility and invoke sympathy for the Swift Vets.
Text over Kerry: The written text of Kerry’s testimony atop of Kerry’s image also provides a benefit. Text in a political ad can enhance comprehension by using multiple senses, and effectively communicates the key message of an ad. In this specific case, the dual sound/text is meant to, perhaps, overwhelm the audience with Kerry’s words. By both hearing and seeing Kerry’s words that affected these vets, the viewer, the hopes are that the viewer, too, becomes affected.
Spotlighting: The ads also make use of the spotlighting technique, singling out members of the photo that John Kerry’s campaign used. By spotlighting these people on the picture, and then having their testimony, it created the illusion that nearly all of the men that John Kerry served with were against him, his service, and believed he had no honor.
Music: Music also plays a key role in the Swift Vets ads, although the music itself is far from “anxiety producing.” The soundtrack, instead, is quite somber, and is designed to reflect the general mood of the ads. The music, specifically, is designed to promote sympathy towards the Swift Vets, as well as for the experiences that they have had to go through.
Letterbox format: The layout of the Swift Vets ads are designed in an interesting fashion that is relatively new. This “letterbox” or “widescreen” format is reminiscent of movie format, and subtly suggests that the Swift Vets have a “story” to tell. Another hypothesis might be that this harkens to a “documentary-like” format, which may enhance perceived truth. As this is a recently new layout, this is merely speculative, and more research would be needed to make any definitive claim.
Implementation
The original buy of $500,000 was shown in three states: West Virginia (Charleston market), Wisconsin (Green Bay and LaCross markets) and Ohio (Dayton market). LaCivita felt that these markets were “in the context of the overall issue debate.” The three states were swing states where LaCivita felt as though the concept of “character” was a major concern to the voters (LaCivita).
The campaign also targeted the media, knowing that the ads would create “a shit storm,” said LaCivita. One account in The Weekly Standard sought to explain this phenomenon:
Against their will, the best-funded and most prestigious journalists in America have been forced to cover a story they want no part of--or at the very least, they've been compelled to explain why they aren't covering it. How did this happen? Analyzing how the Swift boat veterans had injected their story into the mainstream media, Adam Nagourney blamed summer. The Swift boat ad buys, he wrote, had ‘become the subject of television news shows . . . because the advertisements and [Unfit for Command] were released in August, a slow month when news outlets are hungry for any kind of news’ (Last).
Formative Evaluation
An effective communications campaign has in mind a “button” that it wishes for it’s targets to push. The type of behavior that the Swift Vets aimed for their targets to exhibit, was for them to question Kerry’s character and trustworthiness. Secondary aims were for voters to, perhaps ultimately, vote against Kerry.
Surprisingly, there were no pretests or focus groups. “We didn’t focus group one ad,” said LaCivita. “It was all done on instinct. Frankly, it wouldn’t have even mattered if we did.” The group knew the type of negative ad that they were making. “We know what they would have said: ‘It’s too negative.’” According to LaCivita, the “Swifties were hell bound to tell their story,” despite any perceived negativity that their audience might have towards the campaign (LaCivita).
However, LaCivita doesn’t view the campaign as one built on fear, but as one about character. The campaign did not use traditional fear tactics like the “Daisy” or “Willie Horton” ads did. The group merely wanted to challenge perceptions of Kerry’s honesty.
The Swift Vets also knew that this was going to be a wedge issue, for the reason that they felt wedged themselves by Kerry even bringing Vietnam up. Vietnam, in almost all cases, is going to be a wedge issue, by the nature of the political environment during the war. Said National Journal’s Simendinger on CNN’s Reliable Sources:
First of all, Vietnam vets themselves feel very passionate about this and are opposed in their feelings about the war and what happened afterwards and Kerry's performance. But even more fundamentally, and more importantly, John Kerry as the candidate has said this is important for you to know about. My four months in Vietnam, because it helps to make me qualified to be president (CNN).
Kerry’s Response – And Why It Failed
Unlike the Clinton Rapid Response team’s charges against George H.W. Bush, Kerry’s team, in this instance, did not respond to this ad in their own communication campaign. Previously, Kerry’s team had decided to forgo airing campaign ads in the month of August, in order to save money. “We’re going dark in the month of August,” said Kerry campaign manager Mary Beth Cahill.” The Media Fund, one of the pro-Kerry “527” groups, was relied on to pick up the slack, “to be sure a Democratic message is competitive on the airwaves” (Los Angeles Times).
However, because of campaign finance laws, neither political action committees nor “527’s” could expressly advocate a candidate’s positions. Therefore, the groups that Kerry’s team relied upon could not effectively make personal appeals to refute the charges. Kerry’s team felt that the pro-Kerry independent expenditures could cover the fallout, and that they could save money. Instead, the response came in the form of a television ad from MoveOn.
Entitled “Swift Response,” the 30-second ad began by attempting to discredit Bush’s own military record. In the ad, the narrator says: "George Bush used his father to get into the National Guard, and when the chips were down, went missing. Now he's allowing false advertising that attacks John Kerry, a man who asked to go to Vietnam and served with dignity and heroism." The ad ran in the same markets that the Swift Boat ads ran in.
However, the Swift Boat problem didn’t go away. Polls continued to show Bush gaining, and public doubts towards Kerry’s Vietnam service continued to grow. Yet, the Kerry campaign continued to be unresponsive. By the end of the campaign, national public opinion polls “showed that two-thirds of Americans had heard of Swift Boat Ads and one-third of those seeing the commercials believed Kerry had lied about his record, suggesting the anti-Kerry spots significantly impacted voter perceptions (West, 2005, p. 81).”
The PAC/527s also harmed Kerry in another way. By nature, independent expenditures do not work with the candidate, and therefore can’t defend character like staffers can. According to LaCivita, Kerry’s own staff “didn’t know the answer” to the Swift Vets’ accusations. “Our first attack was on what he did while in Vietnam – an issue he steered clear of even to his top staff” (LaCivita). If Kerry’s own staff wasn’t equipped to handle the situation, the independent expenditures surely wouldn’t know the answer.
The main theme of “American hero” was highly undermined by the personal attacks, yet the campaign chose not to directly fight to maintain that image. The campaign could have remained with their theme by relying less on the 527s to portray it, especially with the personal attacks. The traditional media response to highly personal attacks is an ad with the candidate talking directly to the camera, refuting them. Clearly, a 527 could do no such thing.
The combination of both the reliance on independent expenditures and the Kerry team’s unwillingness to defend themselves in the light of character attacks was a major problem. The lack of a willingness to push the trigger to respond and the possession of knowledge to respond were both not there. Together, these were, perhaps, the downfall of the Kerry response, and it likely cost Kerry the election.
Other Elements
There were also unpredictable elements that worked in Swift Vets’ favor. The campaign decided to create the ads well before Kerry and his team decided to use his Vietnam service as the centerpiece of the Democratic Convention in late July. The Swift Vets had planned to run their first ad “on the Thursday of the Democratic National Convention, when Kerry gave his acceptance speech, but because a check didn’t clear, the organization had to wait until Aug. 5” (Eisele & Dufour). The media storm in covering the Swift Vets ads “was made worse by the fact that Kerry made the entire theme of his convention speech about his record in Vietnam – they had no idea what was about to hit them” (LaCivita).
Kerry’s own emphasis on his military service also benefited the Swift Vets on a psychological level. Evidence suggests that the “interaction between fear cues” is “salient for recall of prior relevant news stories.” When an ad attacks a person’s preferred candidate, “fear cues tripled the rate at which these earlier news stories were recalled” (Brader, 2006, p. 136). Thus, when Kerry himself mentioned his military service without launching a campaign against the Swift Vets, doubts and fears were triggered.
Ironically, the Kerry team did not do itself a favor in the way they chose to tout the candidate’s military record. Films shown at the Democratic National Convention were quite sobering, featuring extensive black and white imagery and music in minor keys – almost doing the job for the Swift Vets themselves. Therefore, when the Swift Vets used similar imagery – that was once set to cue enthusiasm by the Kerry campaign – instead cued fear and anxiety.
Analyzing The Campaign: What Did It Do Correctly?
The Swift Vets campaign was successfully able to provide third-party credibility, even when “527” groups were a relatively new concept that the general public was unfamiliar with. By putting veterans against a fellow veteran, these challengers of Kerry’s record were able to portray themselves as credible messengers. Furthermore, the addition of O’Neill, whom many were familiar with, was a valuable asset. It also helped that O’Neill had a best selling book, Unfit For Command, at the same time. The horizontal integration and cross-media strategies of the campaign surely boosted credibility.
While the campaign focused on Kerry, it also indirectly convinced voters to “stay the course” and vote for Bush. “As much as a lot of people didn’t like Bush at the time of the election, I think that even if you had problems with Bush, you felt like Kerry had a military record, but he’s a wimp,” said Johnson. “Kerry’s resume looked so good, but if you kind of scratched the surface, he really has the makings of a good senator, but not a good executive” (Johnson).
While the Swift Vet ads have been accused of using “smear tactics” and, in that sense, have been compared to the 2002 anti-Cleland ads, LaCivita insists that “there is no comparison between (the Swift Boat) issue and those issues we used against Cleland in 2002.” The subject of the ads against Cleland was “his poor voting on military issues and homeland security despite his honorable service,” whereas the ads against Kerry focused on, what was believed, as dishonorable service and made no mention of his voting record in the Senate (LaCivita).
Conclusion
While the methods used by the Swift Vets remains controversial and debated, it can be concluded that the campaign was successful. The campaign highly undermined Kerry’s selling point, and raised questions about Kerry’s military service. While the campaign sought to debate specifics, like Kerry’s actual record and the circumstances on how Kerry won his military honors and medals, it is clear that the Swift Vets’ motivation was Kerry’s actions after the war, which, to some, was reprehensible.
While the campaign is criticized by some for testimonies that can be seen as inconsistent from previous Swift Vet statements, such as Hoffmann’s previous positive comments on Kerry’s conduct, it is clear that Kerry’s actions after the war dramatically shifted how he was viewed by his fellow veterans. This anger was what propelled Swift Vets.
“This was a group of men who witnessed first hand the type of man Kerry was overseas – and his actions and statements upon his return had a life long lasting impact on their well being,” explained LaCivita. “The tactics used were focused on their stories. We told a story of what one man did in country – and what he did when he returned. It was exacerbated by Kerry’s own campaign by putting so much of an emphasis on it” (LaCivita)
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