527s and Single-Theme-Ism
How Can Campaigns Stay On Theme While Relying On Independent Expenditures?
Fall 2005
Single-Theme-ism
The dominant campaign strategy since the early 1980’s is what Medvic calls “single-theme-ism” (Medvic 1991). Medvic explains, citing both academics as well as professionals, that a “candidate’s theme, or message, is his/her answer to the question, ‘Why am I running for this office, at this time, and why should I get elected?’” (Fauchex 1994, 47). It is, in other words, the rationale for why a candidate should be elected and his/her opponent be defeated (Shea 1996, 148; Bradshaw 1995, 42).” Medvic cites “many consultants” who explain that “candidates must have ‘message discipline’ to be successful. This means picking one, and only one, theme and sticking to it (or ‘staying on message’) in all circumstances.”
Similarly, Bradshaw writes that “theme is not a word that should ever have an ‘s’ on the end; there is only one theme (Bradshaw 1995, 42).” In a book co-authored by GOP consultant Mary Matalin and Dem consultant/Clinton campaign manager James Carville, they explain that “the absolute rule of message dissemination and message penetration is consistency and repetition. The principle is the same for political campaigns or companies: Everyone says the same thing, over and over (Matalin & Carville 1994, 80).”
Medvic writes that, while investigating Reagan’s “Issue of the day” strategy, Covington et al. (1993) defined an aspect of the strategy as “homogeneity of the message,” which is, “the degree to which the messages delivered to the press over some period of time are unified in content, creating a single, easily identified, and consistent theme.” A theme “is most likely to influence the public’s image of a candidate,” as opposed to “a variety of messages (that) may deter any single message from being retained, combining to create a confused and less persuasive image” (Covington et al. 1993, 785; Medvic 1991).
However, multiple messages can be used successfully by segmenting demographic groups via targeting, which “enables the candidate to tailor its message to disparate groups” (Medvic, 23). The American Prospect’s Ganz writes, “instead of a single campaign with a single theme that unifies a candidate's supporters, parallel campaigns emerge, each articulating themes narrow enough to appeal to the peculiar characteristics of each sub-constituency.” Ganz uses an example of a California Assembly campaign, where “married Catholic homeowners learned that the candidate supported family values, while single Jewish women under age 40 found the candidate had been consistently pro-choice” (Ganz, American Prospect, 1994). Additionally, consultants evolved direct mail from a fundraising tool to a messaging tool that could target segmented audiences, as it “is far less expensive than television and can market politics to precisely the right voters. Far from aggregating the interests of the electorate, the new campaign thus serves only to further disperse them” (Ganz).
PACs On A National Influence
Political Action Committees were founded by the AFL-CIO in 1943, and began to dominate the political landscape in the 1970’s. These private groups organize to elect or defeat government officials in order to promote their own special interests. These groups were originally single-issue organizations, such as the League of Conservation Voters, who promote environmental issues, or the National Rifle Association, which promotes gun rights.
With their growing influence, interest groups realized that they could now play a major role not only in influencing their own constituencies, but entire national audiences altogether via communication campaigns in Presidential elections. The first sign of this was in 1980, when NCPAC, led by Terry Dolan, aimed to defeat several longtime democratic senators, including the 1972 Democratic Nominee George McGovern. It was realized that a faceless, nameless third party could say nearly anything, and yet the candidates whom the ads supported could “stay clean” in the eyes of the voters (Johnson).
The most classic example of independent expenditures in a presidential campaign is the National Security Political Action Committee’s “Weekend Passes” ad. In the 1988 presidential campaign, with Massachusetts Gov. Mike Dukakis polling significantly ahead of Vice President George Bush by 17 percentage points (West, 4), Bush’s campaign decided that it would be wise to use negative ads to assault the character of Dukakis. The team zeroed in on Willie Horton, “a convicted black man who – while on furlough from a Massachusetts prison – brutally raped a white woman” (West, 4).
Although Dukakis did not start the furlough program, he did support it as a method of rehabilitation, and, in 1976, vetoed a bill that would have made inmates convicted of first-degree murder ineligible for furloughs (Wikipedia.org). Bush seized on the Horton issue, “bringing it up repeatedly in campaign speeches.” Atwater declared that "by the time this election is over, Willie Horton will be a household name." Media consultant Roger Ailes reportedly remarked that "the only question is whether we depict Willie Horton with a knife in his hand or without it” (Wikipedia.org).
In late September of that campaign year, the National Security Political Action Committee began running the “Weekend Passes” attack ad, using the Horton issue, as well as a “menacing mug short of Horton,” to appeal to what political consultant Larry McCarthy called “every suburban mother’s greatest fear.” The day after “Weekend Passes” went off the air, the Bush campaign created their own version, entitled “Revolving Door,” which also used the furlough program as an issue. While the ad “did not mention Horton or feature his photograph, it did depict a variety of intimidating-looking men walking in and out of prison through a revolving door” (Wikipedia.org).
The tactic worked, and Bush went on to win the election. The ad served not only as an attack ad model that would be used for the next 20 years, but also as a new type of technique for a campaign to hit their opponent hard, without any backlash.
Darrell West writes:
“If (the Bush camp) directly attacked Dukakis, their campaign could suffer a backlash from people upset over negative campaigning…At the same time, however, taking advantage of a loophole in campaign finance rules, outside groups would run a second campaign that was much tougher. The outside track would feature ‘brass knuckles’ tactics that would appeal to the basest instincts of the American public on the subject of race. This unauthorized and uncoordinated campaign would say things and run advertisements that could not be said by the official Bush organization” (West, InsidePolitics).
McCain-Feingold And The Rise Of The 527
The 107th Congress’s McCain-Feingold Campaign Reform Bill sought to ban all soft money contributions to national political parties “from corporations, labor unions, and wealthy individuals.” These provisions shut down the “Washington soft money machine, prohibiting the $100,000, $250,000 and even $500,000 contributions that for the last decade have flowed to the political parties” (Hoover Institution). The rise of the 527 is “a byproduct of the McCain-Feingold reform law…The groups can, and do, run almost all the elements of a political campaign” (Mother Jones).
The term “527” was coined from the section number of the Internal Revenue code that “allows all partisan political organizations to take contributions without paying taxes on them, to the extent the money is used on political purposes” (Sandler & Reiff). In the late 1990’s, the IRS “issued a series of rulings that essentially liberalized what a 527 group can do with tax-exempt money.” Activities such as voter guides and issue advocacy ads were “exempt function” activities for a section 527 organization, meaning that they were functions legal under the tax laws for these types of groups. Thus, a 527 is an organization that can “take largely unlimited contributions from any source and can spend them on advertising or other communications that praises or criticizes candidates without expressly advocating anyone’s election or defeat independently or any affected candidate or party committee” (Sandler & Reiff).
The 2004 Election Cycle
After a costly primary campaign, the Kerry camp decided to augment their costs with a reliance on 527s. The Kerry team was concerned that the Bush camp would raise record amounts of money, and that they would not be able to compete dollar for dollar. Major players of the Pro-Kerry 527 coalition included MoveOn.org, The Media Fund, which served as the ad outlet; America Coming Together, which was responsible for the get-out-the-vote drive; America Votes, the “umbrella organization that will stitch together the activities of various progressive organizations;” The Thunder Road Group, which concentrated on research and rapid response; and the Joint Victory Campaign 2004, a fundraising group (Balz & Edsall). Many of the 527s involved were “staffed by big-name ghosts of past presidential and congressional campaigns.” For example, Jim Jordan, Kerry’s former campaign manager, served in the 2004 general election as “a consultant to the Media Fund, and Harold Ickes, Clinton’s former deputy chief of staff, heads it” (MotherJones).
Through the 527s, the Democrats were able to meet their goal of matching Bush’s funds. Dems “collected almost twice as much money as their Republican rivals in the presidential race.” Groups supporting Kerry or opposing Bush raised $266 million. Those opposing Kerry or backing Bush collected $144 million (Theimer).
This idea was brand-new, and the ramifications were unclear. What was known, however, was that the 527 groups were keeping the Kerry campaign afloat. Many knew immediately after Kerry captured the nomination that Bush would “use his war chest to paint a highly unflattering portrait of the Massachusetts senator for voters who are just beginning to tune in to the contest- -- and that Kerry may not be able to answer in time because of limited resources” (Newsday).
Sure enough, Bush’s camp launched an $80 million advertising blitz during March and April designed to define Kerry before he was able to define himself. The 527s decided that they needed to keep Kerry competitive, and launched their own blitzes. However, “the campaign-finance laws constraining the 527s” had, in fact, successfully kept the 527s from “doing anything to actively promote Kerry. When the Bush-Cheney campaign hammered Kerry” with that advertising blitz, “the 527s responded with an array of issue ads that did nothing to define Kerry or introduce him to voters. The ads focused on such topics as health care, job outsourcing, and the federal budget deficit” (Franke-Ruta).
While the groups had, according to UVA professor Larry Sabato, done a “yeoman’s service” for Kerry and “kept Kerry competitive since he won the nomination,” (Koff/Naymik) they had done nothing to define Kerry before the Bush campaign had defined Kerry themselves. Unlike with the strategy of single-theme-ism, the Kerry camp had yet to create a simple theme that all groups could rally behind. Instead, messages from all different camps diluted any theme the Kerry team could have put forth. While the 527’s had relieved the Kerry team of their financial burden, they also unintentionally relieved them of control of their messages.
By the beginning of May, the pro-Kerry 527 groups had spent $30 million on ads for Kerry and anti-Bush ads. After an extremely successful fundraising drive, Kerry had $80 million in the bank, and put his campaign into super drive. Kerry eventually began advocacy ads, unveiling a $25-million TV ad campaign that touted “Kerry's Vietnam War experience and his political career as ‘a lifetime of service and strength.’” “Heart” featured daughter Vanessa Kerry, and “Lifetime” featured Del Sandusky, who served under Kerry in Vietnam. The ads ran in 17 battleground states as well the Republican-leaning states of Colorado and Louisiana (White House Bulletin).
The advocacy ads seemingly worked. Going into August, Kerry was leading in virtually every poll, all the way until the end of that month. CBS had Kerry up 51% to 44%, Time had Kerry up 51% to 43%, and even a FOX/Opinion Dynamics poll had Kerry up 46% to 43% (pollingreport.com). With this large lead, the Kerry campaign decided to rely again on the 527s to run ads while they aimed to keep spending down in order to preserve the $75 million that the campaign was allowed to spend on matching funds after the Democratic Convention. As the GOP Convention was weeks after, the Bush team would have a monetary advantage over Kerry if the Kerry camp didn’t preserve their $75 million.
“We’re going dark in the month of August,” said Kerry campaign manager Mary Beth Cahill. The Media Fund was relied on to pick up the slack “to be sure a Democratic message is competitive on the airwaves” (Los Angeles Times). "We don't know exactly how much money (the GOP has). They're going to spend an extraordinary amount of it in trying to obliterate John Kerry and John Edwards.”
In the meantime, the Kerry campaign was expecting to ride free media and a post-convention bounce in the polls. But no bounce emerged. In light of the opportunities that arose, GOP insiders felt as though it was time to do exactly what Cahill envisioned. A GOP 527 group, Swift Boat Veterans For Truth, directed by Rear Admiral Roy Hoffman, emerged.
The lead advisor was GOP consultant/ex-NRSC Executive Director Chris LaCivita, and the group was also associated with John O’Neill, who was identified by the Wall Street Journal as having "served in Coastal Division 11 in 1969-1970, winning two Bronze Stars and additional decorations for his service in Vietnam (Media Matters).” O’Neill is historically seen as a “counterfoil” to Kerry, and was urged by then-President Nixon to counter Kerry during an appearance on The Dick Cavett Show. In 1972, O'Neill, who had the enthusiastic support of President Nixon and his staff, spoke on Nixon's behalf at the Republican National Convention (Boston Globe).
Despite the small ad buy, the national media picked the story up, showing the ads to the nation. Polls began to swing in Bush’s favor. With the Kerry camp still not willing to spend their $75 million, a response came in the form of a television ad from MoveOn. Entitled “Swift Response,” the 30-second ad began by attempting to discredit Bush’s own military record. In the ad, the narrator says: "George Bush used his father to get into the National Guard, and when the chips were down, went missing. Now he's allowing false advertising that attacks John Kerry, a man who asked to go to Vietnam and served with dignity and heroism." The ad ran in the same markets that the Swift Boat ads ran in.
However, the Swift Boat problem didn’t go away. Polls continued to show Bush gaining, and public doubts towards Kerry’s Vietnam service continued to grow. Yet, the Kerry campaign continued to be unresponsive. By the end of the campaign, national public opinion polls “showed that two-thirds of Americans had heard of Swift Boat Ads and one-third of those seeing the commercials believed Kerry had lied about his record, suggesting the anti-Kerry spots significantly impacted voter perceptions (Nagourney & Elder, New York Times/ West, 81).”
Analysis
After the Swift Boat attacks, Kerry’s campaign struggled to find a single theme. The main theme of “American hero” was highly undermined by the personal attacks, yet the campaign chose not to fight to maintain that image. The campaign could have remained with their theme by relying less on the 527s to portray it, especially with the personal attacks. The traditional media response to highly personal attacks is an ad with the candidate talking directly to the camera, refuting them. Clearly, a 527 could do no such thing. This was, perhaps, the downfall of the Kerry campaign. A 527 can run highly effective attack ads, as shown in the Swift Boat campaign, the Willie Horton campaign, and NitPAC. But, 527s cannot be effective in advocacy ads.
Both the Kerry campaign team and the pro-Kerry 527’s had no idea where to go next. Both tried to use a buffet of traditional staples such as economic issues, education issues, and health care. As the 527s could not have correspondence with the campaign to form a global strategy, the campaigns were theme-less. With the Kerry campaign not advocating a new theme, the 527s could not pick up the themes and run with them, unlike the NSPAC, who used clues from George H.W. Bush’s campaign speeches to reinforce campaign themes. Varying messages came in from everywhere, and the campaign could no longer find a single theme. For these reasons, among others, the Kerry campaign ended in defeat.
What’s the solution?
The Kerry camp failed to recognize the value of single-theme-ism, and lacked the insight to realize that 527s should not develop their own independent theme. The strategy cannot be to have 527s run a national campaign and develop themes themselves. The job of the candidate’s campaign should be to define a theme, develop it, run with it, and defend it. The job of the 527s, as they are interest groups, should be to adapt the campaign’s themes to their constituencies, and then perpetuate the themes in that way. This would mirror the traditional notion of Ganz and Medvic, where parallel campaigns emerge to please constituencies.
527s, of course, can still be used to go negative, as they are traditionally successful in this manner. But they must stay on target and take hints from the campaign themselves, via the candidate’s stump speeches or any communication outlets, such as press releases or web logs.
However, staying on message and using the concept of single-theme-ism could be hard to do for some 527s. While some employ figureheads such as Jim Jordan or Chris LaCivita, not many can afford high-priced consultants. One possible solution would be to create a new 527 group devoted strictly to message development, unification, and control. As PACs and 527s can communicate with each other, it would make sense to develop a communications think tank that could develop and distribute messages to other 527s. The result would be one unified message that could provide constituencies with successful and specific messages that could coordinate with the developed global theme. As 527s can receive unlimited cash, they could employ top consultants and distribute at no cost to other 527s that would receive these communication strategies.
Conclusion
The implementation of 527s to the political spectrum is brand new, and success can only be obtained through experience. What is clear from the events of the 2004 presidential election is that themes must be defined primarily by the campaigns themselves, not via 527s that the campaign relies on. Personal attacks must be addressed by the campaign itself, no matter the financial cost, or the campaign will be doomed. Relying on 527s for attack, contrast, and issues-oriented messages seems to work, but advocacy ads cannot “strike home” if the message does not originate from the candidates themselves.
REFERENCES
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Franke-Ruta, G. “Mission Semi-Accomplished.” The American Prospect. June 2004.
Ganz, M. “Voters In The Crosshairs.” American Prospect. Dec. 1994.
Hoover Institution. “The McCain-Feingold-Cochran Campaign Reform Bill.” <http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/legislation/mccain.html> 16 Nov. 2005
Johnson, Andi. Producer, Murphy Putnam Shorr & Partners, LLC. Personal Interview. 8 Oct. 2005.
Koff, S. and M. Naymik. “Counting on 527.” Cleveland Plain Dealer. 20 June 2004.
Los Angeles Times. “Kerry Ad Campaign ‘To Go Dark’ In August.” 27 July 2005.
Matalin, M. & J. Carville. “All’s Fair: Love and Running for President.” Random House, 1994. P. 80.
Medvic, Stephen K.. 2001.Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press. pp 9-36.
Sandler, J. and N. Reiff. “The ‘527’ Fuss Explained.” Campaigns & Elections. Aug. 2004.
Theimer, S. “Kerry loss wasn’t over money.” AP. 13 Dec. 2004.
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